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HONG KONG'S ECONOMY UNDER CHINESE
RULE: PROSPERITY AND STABILITY?
Anna M. Han
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1997, the world witnessed the transition of Hong Kong from
British to Chinese rule.' Many questions about Hong Kong's future remain
unanswered. The question presented at the International Law Section's Panel
Discussion at the American Association of Law Schools ("AALS")
Conference in San Francisco is: does international law matter to the future
of Hong Kong? Specifically this author was asked: are there any
international restraints on' China's activities, vis-a-vis Hong Kong's
economy, which could be imposed on China for violating Hong Kong's
political or economic autonomy? The conclusion this author reached is that
while Hong Kong is a member of numerous treaties, none of these treaties
provide for an effective enforcement mechanism with which to protect Hong
Kong. 2 Therefore, should China change its economic policies governing
Hong Kong, the international community has few, if any, remedies at its
disposal. 3 Given this conclusion, this paper must necessarily address a
different issue. Part II of this article explores China's self-interests in
* Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University. B.A., University of California, Berkeley; J.D.,
Hastings College of the Law. This article was presented at the AALS conference in San Francisco on
January 18, 1998. The author wishes to thank Professor Maria Frankowska for organizing the panel
and her research assistants, Elizabeth Loh and Craig Silman, for their assistance.
1. On July I, 1997, after 99 years of colonial rule, British control ofHong Kong ended. On this date,
Hong Kong was officially returned to China.
2. Some of the examples of treaties to which Hong Kong is a signatory are: General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, December 27, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 123; Agreement Establishing the Asian Development
Bank, December 4, 1965, 571 U.N.T.S. 123.
3. When international communities can agree to a particular standard for an issue (e.g. human rights), and
ifa particular region or nation is perceived to be violating those standards, economic sanctions can be
used as an effective means of forcing the country to change its policies. But with the issue ofeconomic
policies, the problem is entirely different. First, using economic sanctions as a tool to implement
economic policies is not effective, since sanctions tend to harm the economy which is being protected.
Secondly, it would be nearly impossible for the international community to agree on what constitutes
a correct standard of economic policy. Economics is one of the few areas where there exists a
tremendous range of systems, from virtually free market economies to economies with substantial
government regulation. No nation can make a valid claim that another should follow a particular set
of economic policies.
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preserving Hong Kong's economic system and how those balance against
Hong Kong's own. To better understand how to preserve Hong Kong's
economic prosperity, one must also examine how Hong Kong has achieved
this prosperity. Part III of this article will extend this inquiry into Hong
Kong's economic future by identifying key factors which contribute to Hong
Kong's current economic prosperity. Additionally, Part III will discuss the
sustain ability of Hong Kong's economy if these essential factors are
removed or substantially altered by its new ruler. These factors will be
examined using examples from China's past handling of its own economy.
Lastly, Part IV will provide some conclusions and predictions on Hong
Kong's economic future.
II. HONG KONG'S ROLE IN CHINA'S ECONOMY
When examining Hong Kong's contribution to China's economy, the
inevitable conclusion is that Hong Kong is a major contributor to China's
booming economy. Hong Kong handles more than 50 percent of all of
China's exports and imports.4 Hong Kong is also the gateway for 55 percent
of net foreign direct investment into China.5 There is no question that well
before the transfer of Hong Kong from British to Chinese rule, Hong Kong's
economy was already intricately tied to China's.6
Hong Kong's influence on China is evident by looking across the
border into China's various Special Economic Zones.7 Hong Kong's
prosperity and economic proficiency is increasingly the ideal for China to
achieve. However, the two economic systems in place in these two regions
are extremely different. While market mechanisms are slowly being
introduced into China, overall, the government continues to exert a fair
amount of control over the economy, both at the micro and macro level.
Most large enterprises are still state owned In contrast, Britain took an
extremely laissez-faire attitude towards Hong Kong's economy. The British
4. See Business as.Usual Afler Hong Kong Takeover, MONEY MARKETING, July 3, 1997, at 22.
5. See id.
6. See View from Beijing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 9, 1995, at 12.
7. Such zones as Shenzhen are flourishing and surpassing the interior regions of China in terms of
prosperity. Under Deng Xiao-Ping, China followed a policy which allowed China's coastal regions to
become "rich first." This policy has allowed pockets of wealth to accrue in coastal regions. This has
created a striking difference in economic conditions between China's coastal and inner regions. See
A Smooth Transition Successor Will Follow Deng's Blueprint, THE HERALD (GLASGOw), Feb. 2 1,
1997, at 24.
8. Currently there are over 305,000 state owned enterprises in China. See Mark Clifford, Can China
Reform its Economy, Bus. WK., Sept. 29, 1997, at 116.
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government provided any support deemed necessary, but interfered
minimally in the micro level of businesses. 9 In fact, under British rule, Hong
Kong could be said to be a prime example of a free market economy.o
One might question whether these two dramatically different economic
systems can co-exist. The reality is that these two systems have existed
concurrently for many years. Whether under British or Chinese rule, Hong
Kong is heavily dependent on China." Now more than ever, the Chinese
government continues to play a vital role in Hong Kong's economy through
the slow, private acquisition of major Hong Kong businesses. 2 With the
passing of July 1, 1997, the only obvious difference is that a single
government entity will be in charge of the fate of both China and Hong
Kong. In deciding the direction of Hong Kong's economy, China must
account for the impact of any of Hong Kong's policies on the welfare of
those on the mainland. While some scholars, including some on the panel,
would argue there is a separate Hong Kong government looking out for the
interest of the Hong Kong people, this author would suggest that in terms of
major policy decisions, the current Hong Kong government, as constituted,
is taking its marching orders from Beijing.' 3 Until Hong Kong is ruled by
a democratically elected government, the assumption must be that decisions
made in Hong Kong have either the explicit consent or, at a minimum, the
tacit acceptance of the Beijing government. As such, the question then
becomes: how will the Chinese government decide the future of Hong
Kong's economy?
9. Hearing of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., Mar. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS News Library, Curnws File.
10. Rags to riches stories about Hong Kong residents who entered into successful careers or started
successful businesses abound in Hong Kong. See Kevin Sinclair, The Sky's the Limit in a Land of
Choice, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 14, 1997, at 19.
11. Hong Kong relies on China to supply water and for produce, meat, and many other basic resources.
See Dinah Lee, A Colony Living on the Edge of Chaos, Bus. WK., Aug. 4, 1997, at 23.
12. Most ofChina's investments in Hong Kong are in vital industries. In 1996, CITIC and China National
Aviation, two large Chinese state owned enterprises, became majority shareholders in Cathay Pacific's
subsidiary, Dragon Air. China Telecom acquired a 5.5 percent interest ofHong Kong Telecom in June
of 1997. See Yojana Sharma, Hong Kong-Finance: China Inc. Marches Into New Territory, INTER
PRESS SERV., July 18, 1997, at 2, available in LEXIS News Library, Inpres File.
13. The Chief Executive Officer and the Provisional Legislative Committee of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region were appointed by Beijing and replaced the legislative council which was
originally chosen by democratic elections. It unlikely this Chinese appointed government-will allow
the interest of the Hong Kong people to supersede orders from Beijing if the two should clash. While
preparations for direct elections are underway, it is unlikely that groups supporting an independent
Hong Kong government will gain a majority in the new legislative council because ofthe way in which
the voting districts will be drawn up. See Carole J. Petersen, Preserving Institutions of Autonomy in
Hong Kong: The Impact of 1997 on Academia and the Legal Profession (presented at the AALS
Conference on January 18, 1998).
1998
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A. The Basic Law-Expression of Good Intentions
China's intentions for Hong Kong, after 1997, can be found in the
Basic Law. 4 The Basic Law is intended to be a quasi-constitution governing
Hong Kong over the next fifty years.' 5 In fact, the Basic Law specifically
addresses Hong Kong's economic issues.'
6
Unfortunately, Basic Law provisions dealing with Hong Kong's
economic system tend to be a statement of goals rather than a governing
model. 17 These provisions state China's desire to maintain Hong Kong's
ability to remain an international financial center. For example, the Basic
Law states that it is the People's Republic of China's intent to "provide an
appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the
status of Hong Kong as an international finance centre. " The integrity of
the legal system, as addressed by Professor Mushkat of the panel, will be
much dependant on the court's ability to interpret and apply Hong Kong law
to Hong Kong. The balance of power between the Hong Kong judiciary and
China's National People's Congress in determining the Basic Law will
determine if there will be an "appropriate" legal environment for the
economy. Aspirational statements, by themselves, are meaningless unless
the Hong Kong government is given the power to make those goals a reality.
14. BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1519 (1990) [hereinafter BASIC LAW]. A lengthy discussion of
the Basic Law is not within the scope of this paper. However, much debate surrounds the status of the
Basic Law. Most People's Republic of China ("PRC") legal scholars tend to view the Basic Law as
on par with any other domestic Chinese legislation-it is amendable and can be interpreted by the
National People's Congress. See XIANFA [Constitution], art. 67.
15. The Joint Declaration between Britain and China agrees to preserve Hong Kong's "previous capitalist
system and lifestyle." Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic ofChina on the Question of Hong
Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 23 I.L.M. 1366, 1372 [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
16. The Basic Law contains a number of provisions intended to ensure the continuation of a market
system in Hong Kong. One example is Article 106, which specifies that revenues generated in Hong
Kong will remain in Hong Kong and that the PRC government will not levy taxes in Hong Kong.
See BASIC LAW, supra note 15, art. 106.
17. The United States Constitution provides an excellent example of inspirational goals. The Constitution
guarantees certain equalities to its citizens. However, after over 200 years, the United States is still
trying to achieve some of these goals. For example, the civil rights debate still rages in the United
States although the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part, "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
18. See BASIC LAW, supra note 15, art. 109.
[Vol. 22
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Article 108 is another example of an ambitious but ambiguous policy
of the Basic Law. Article 108 states that Hong Kong will have an
independent tax system which will implement the "low tax policy previously
pursued in Hong Kong."' 9 In theory, this is good policy because low tax
jurisdictions are attractive to businesses. However, the Basic Law offers no
guidance on how Hong Kong is to go about maintaining this low tax policy.
Given Hong Kong's current corporate tax rate of 16.5 percent, 20 a 10 percent
increase may still be within the boundaries of the Basic Law's concept of
"low." Even if 26.5 percent is considered low by international standards,
an increase could signal a change in policy which could prove detrimental to
Hong Kong's economy.
The last example of the importance of the international perception of
Hong Kong as a favorable place to do business relates to the protection of
intellectual property. Prior to 1997, Hong Kong had a complete set of
intellectual property laws.2' Hong Kong is also a signatory of many
intellectual property conventions, including the Paris Convention on
Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, and the Geneva and Paris Universal Copyright
Conventions. Hong Kong is also a participating member of the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"). 22
However, membership to the various international intellectual property
conventions and having intellectual property laws does not necessarily serve
to impede the infringement of intellectual property rights. This paradox is
readily apparent in China. While China possesses a body of intellectual
property laws that are consistent with international standards, it is perceived
as a major violator of intellectual property rights.' Enforcement of the laws
is sporadic and China has continuously been criticized for its failure to
systematically enforce its intellectual property laws. Consequently, this
failure had led to the threat of unilateral sanctions on the part of the United
States on numerous occasions.'
19. See BASIC LAW, supra note 15, art. 108.
20. See Sarah Davison, Hong Kong Hopingfor Budget Boost With '97 Tax Cuts, REurERsWoRLDSERv.,
Mar. 11, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS News Library, Cumws File.
21. See David Shannon and Tan Loke-Khoon, Intellectual Property Development and Enforcement
Challenges in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, CAL. INT'L PRAC., Spring-Summer
1997, at 15.
22. See AngelaYoung, Hong Kong: CD Products Market (2), U.S. & FoREiGNCoMMERciALSERv., Aug.
20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9850761.
23. See Anna M. Han, Technology Licensing to China: The Influence of Culture, 19 HAsTmlGS INT'L &
Comp. L. REv. 629 (1995-1996).
24. See id.
1998
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Prior to 1997, Hong Kong, on the other hand, was viewed as a
relatively good enforcer of intellectual property rights. 5 In 1996, Hong
Kong customs officials raided 1,282 shops and hawker stalls, arrested 1,268
people and seized 578,976 compact discs, video compact discs and CD-
ROMs worth approximately 4 million dollars. 6 However, despite these
enforcement efforts, Hong Kong is now appearing on the United States
Trade Representative's Section 301 list for the first time for the volume of
27
unchecked infringements.
Theoretically, with China in control of Hong Kong, enforcement of
intellectual property laws should significantly improve as coordinated efforts
between China and Hong Kong develop, strengthening their mutual borders.
Smuggling of pirated compact discs across the border should become more
difficult. However, it is also equally possible that with these coordinated
efforts, information leaks to the pirates will become more prevalent as well,
making enforcement more difficult.2 8
If Hong Kong is to continue to attract high quality international
investments, particularly technologically advanced investment, it must alter
its image of being a safe haven for piracy and attempt to revive its reputation
as an enforcer of intellectual property rights. Currently, the Hong Kong
government is working on new trademark and patent laws. 29 Although new
legislation will be beneficial, emphasis should be placed on enhancing
enforcement.
Clearly, mere enumeration of goals within the Basic Law is insufficient
to maintain Hong Kong's economic prosperity. Bolstering the international
perception of Hong Kong as a favorable place to do business is crucial to its
25. Hong Kong still has a reputation of being a relatively easy place to obtain Chinese made pirated
software. See Andrew Chetham, Giants of Software Name Hong Kong as Piracy Capital, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 12, 1997, at 1.
26. See Angela Young, Hong Kong: CD Products Market (2), U.S. & FOREIGN COM. SERV., Aug. 20,
1997, available in 1997 WL 9850761.
27. According to the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, this was due to increased copyright piracy in
Hong Kong over the last year in spite of U.S. requests for action and greater effort on Hong Kong's
part. See Andrew Cheatham, Government Slams US. for Ignoring Anti-Piracy Action; Hong Kong
Put on IPR Watch List, Bus. POST, May 2, 1997, at 1.
28. Two of the difficulties in enforcing intellectual property rights in China have been bribery and
corruption of local police forces. When a raid is to occur, some police may be paid offand then notify
the pirates to close shop. This has often resulted in the police finding nothing more than empty factory
space. See Bruce Einhom, China's CD Pirates Find a New Hangout, Bus. WK., Dec. 8, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 14814661.
29. See Thomas T. Moga, Hong Kong 1997: A Change in Government, A Change in the Patent System,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Jan. 1997, at 18.
[Vol. 22330
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future prosperity. It remains to be seen, however, whether China will
maintain policies that allow for Hong Kong's continuing economic success.
B. Balancing Stability versus Economic Advantage
One key difference in distinguishing the way the Chinese will handle
Hong Kong's political and economic environment as opposed to British rule,
is what emphasis China will place on maintaining overall stability in its
territories. In deciding its own economic policy, China has consistently
stressed its desire to maintain social and political stability at the expense of
economic objectives. This is obvious in the way China is approaching the
privatization of its state owned enterprises.3 While China understands that
economic efficiency would best be served through quick privatization or
shutdown of state owned enterprises, the Chinese government is weighing
economic pragmatism against the fear of social unrest which would occur
after the resulting massive unemployment as state owned enterprises are
allowed to go bankrupt or join the private sector. To avoid this, China has
opted to gradually phase in privatization in order to achieve social stability.
China's predilection for stability is further illustrated by the way it
indirectly handled the recent Asian currency crisis as it impacted Hong
Kong. As economy after economy in Southeast Asia collapsed,3' China was
spared this particular fate, ironically, because of the inconvertibility of its
currency.32 Hong Kong was spared the brunt of the regional economic
downturn since its currency is tied to the U.S. dollar.33
In dealing with the economic crisis plaguing the region, Hong Kong's
government had several options to choose from. First, the government could
have floated Hong Kong's currency against other international currencies.
Alternatively, it could have devalued the Hong Kong dollar while keeping
it tied to the U.S. dollar. Finally, Hong Kong could have kept its policy of
30. In his speech to the 15th Party Congress in Beijing's Great Hall of the People, Jiang Ze Min stressed
the need for policy changes that would downsize China's debt ridden state owned enterprises. See
Mark Clifford, Can China Reform its Economy, BUS. WK., Sept. 29, 1997, at 116.
31. In Indonesia, the rupiah plunged to a record low of 11,800 to the dollar on January 21, 1998, a quarter
of its value a year earlier. Likewise, Thailand is under similar economic distress and some predict
further economic contraction in the coming year. See John McBeth, Indonesia: Ground Zero, FAR
E. EcON. REv., Jan. 22, 1998, at 14-16.
32. See World Bank Praises China's Financial Stabilizing Effect, XINHUIA NEws AGENCY, Jan. 15, 1998,
at 1, available in LEXIS News Library, Cumws file.
33. The Hong Kong dollar is currently tied to the U.S. dollar at a rate of 7.8 to 1. See Eugene Saver, Hong
Kong's Steady Dollar, WORLD TRADE, June 1996, at 84.
1998
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tying its currency to the U.S. dollar at the current rate.34 These choices
presented distinct economic and political consequences. By devaluing the
Hong Kong dollar or allowing it to float against other currencies, Hong
Kong exports and Hong Kong as an investment center would have remained
competitive with its Asian neighbors. The last alternative would have
presented economic disadvantages for Hong Kong, but would have offered
general stability at both the economic and political level. Given the
uncertainties expressed by the international community about post-1997
prosperity, the Hong Kong government opted for political stability over
economic advantage.35 This recent decision, as reflected in the handling of
Hong Kong's currency, indicates that the Hong Kong government, with the
approval of Beijing, will opt for political stability over economic advantage.
This is consistent with past Chinese policies.
Given China's expression of its aspirations for Hong Kong in the Basic
Law as well as its own economic interests, there is little doubt that China has
the best of intentions towards Hong Kong. However, it is necessary to
consider factors which would lead China to reverse its current economic
policies toward Hong Kong. If Hong Kong's practice of capitalism begins
to interfere with China's economy, it is likely that China will take a more
active stance in controlling Hong Kong's economic policies. So long as
Hong Kong's system is perceived to be a positive contributor to the Chinese
economy, Hong Kong will remain "autonomous." However, if Hong
Kong's economy takes a significant downturn that impacts China by way of
unemployment or other such negative consequences, this may cause China
to become as active in the management of Hong Kong enterprises as it is
with those on the mainland.
Similarly, on the political and social front, while the Chinese
government has been remarkably restrained in its handling of democracy
movement protesters, should these protests begin to spill over into the
mainland and cause political and social unrest, familiar control measures may
well be implemented.
34. Id.
35. Most recently,just based on a rumor of possible currency devaluation, there were a number of runs on
Hong Kong banks. Rumors ofthe possible closure of a popular Hong Kong bakery chain caused Hong
Kong residents to line up for blocks to redeem pastry coupons. Of course, the rumors were unfounded.
See Catherine Shepherd & Law Siu-Lan, Consumers on the Run, ASIAWEEK, Dec. 12, 1997, at 31.
(Vol. 22
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III. FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE HONG KONG'S ECONOMY
Enumerating the various factors which contribute to Hong Kong's
economic success, the following lead the list: an efficient civil service,
minimal government regulation, an independent judiciary, neutral
enforcement of laws and regulations, and the entrepreneurial spirit of the
Hong Kong populace.
Of the above enumerated factors, the judicial structure and its
continuing independence is being addressed separately by another panelist.
Therefore, this article will not seek to explore this issue in depth. Suffice it
to say, it is extremely important that Hong Kong laws should remain
transparent and their enforcement should be free from political influence.
Government interference in business, as discussed above, will be dependent
upon Hong Kong's level of contribution to China's overall economic
development. Chinese interference in the governing of Hong Kong will also
depend upon whether or not Hong Kong's activities will negatively affect the
mainland. The entrepreneurial spirit of Hong Kong's people will be
dependent largely on the continuing prosperity of its economic system.
Therefore, this section will be devoted to the discussion of the continuing
efficiency of Hong Kong's civil service and what might disrupt its function.
A. Civil Service
A key factor in the continued economic prosperity of Hong Kong is the
continuance of Hong Kong's civil service. Hong Kong's civil service has
been a significant factor in its success and a decline in the high standards of
the civil service would be detrimental to Hong Kong's competitiveness in the
region." One of the main factors in Hong Kong's success as an international
trading center has been minimal bureaucratic interference in conducting
business and the perception that civil servants facilitate rather than impede
business.
Currently, the people of Hong Kong and the international community
view the Hong Kong civil service, under the leadership of Anson Chan, as
36. See Ron Corben, Hong Kong Official Fears Decline in Civil Service Rules, J. COM., Mar. 27, 1997,
at 4A.
1998
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a positive factor in keeping Hong Kong an attractive business location.37
During the period of the handover, there was much discussion over the
importance of the continuity of Hong Kong's government services.
Agreement by Anson Chan to continue as Hong Kong's Chief Civil Servant
boosted the confidence of many in Hong Kong's business circles. 38
B. Corruption
During the handover, one of the greatest fears expressed by the Hong
Kong populace during the handover was not, as some media reports
indicated, the loss of political freedom, but rather concern over Hong Kong's
economic freedom.39 Stronger than the fear of importation of the People's
Liberation Army, was the fear of the infiltration of corrupt practices
currently prevalent in mainland China. There is little doubt China is plagued
with the problems of corruption. 4° Hong Kong's fear is quite justified
considering that even as the transition took place, increased favor seeking
and claims of good "guanxi"4" with officials who were coming into power
after July 1, 1997 began to take place in Hong Kong.42
In the past, Hong Kong, like many other developing regions, had its
problems with corruption. As such, Hong Kong struggled with the resulting
economic byproducts, such as waste and the loss of consumer confidence.
In response to these problems, the British government created the
Independent Commission Against Corruption ("ICAC") in 1974. 43 This
commission Was given vast supervisory and enforcement powers." With the
lead of the ICAC, Hong Kong made tremendous strides in eliminating
37. See Steve Higgins, Hong Kong Leader Anson Chan, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Apr. 30, 1996, at AI,
available in LEXIS News Library, Cumws File.
38. Many believe that Anson Chan's decision to stay on after the handover will serve to boost civil service
morale. See John Ridding, Hong Kong Deputy Chief to Stay After Chinese Takeover, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Dec. 30, 1996, at 14.
39. Under British rule, the Chinese residents of Hong Kong did not enjoy much political freedom and it
can be said that they were extremely apolitical until recent years. See John Ridding, Hong Kong's
Anti-Graft Chief Stakes Out Territory: Lily Yam is Determined to Keep the Word 'Independent'in
the Title of the Commission She Heads, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), June 6, 1997, at 4.
40. See JULIA KWONG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN CHINA (1997).
41. "Guanxi" or "connection" has several meanings in the context ofdoing business in China. It can mean
having a legitimate existing relationship which would facilitate business or it can mean an illicit contact
which would allow the parties to circumvent the rules.
42. Post-Handover corruption has continued to be a major threat to Hong Kong's way of life. See Sarah
Davidson, Hong Kong Haunted by Post-97 Corruption Fears, REUTERS WORLD SERV., May 8, 1997.
43. See Hong Kong Graft Buster Vows No Letup After Handover, REUTERS WORLD SERV., June 3, 1997.
44. See id
[Vol. 22
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corruption and instilling confidence in the fairness of Hong Kong's economic
system in both the people of Hong Kong and the international community.45
The existence of the ICAC allowed Hong Kong to employ a meritocracy.'
The introduction of mainland China's corrupt practices would have a
disastrous social and economic effect on Hong Kong. If the method for
success changes from merit to corruption, then economic rewards will not
come from engaging in hard work, but from pursuing influence and offering
bribes. On the business front, once foreign business sees that business is
done on the basis of "guanxi," then, in all likelihood, industries will begin
to pull away from this particular system. While there will be those who
continue doing business in Hong Kong based on good connections, these
transactions will usually not be as efficient or beneficial for the economy as
a whole,
One method China can use to reduce the influx of corruption into Hong
Kong would be to allow the ICAC to continue doing the work which it has
successfully been doing since 1974. The ICAC should continue to
vigorously investigate and prosecute corruption and graft at all levels of
government.47 By working to eliminate corruption, Hong Kong will
demonstrate to the international community its seriousness about remaining
an international finance and trade center.
Controversy was raised recently over the ICAC's future role in Hong
Kong when the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR")
removed the word "Independent" from the Commission's title. 48 Lily Yam,
the ICAC chief, has stated that even though there has been a name change,
this will not hinder its efforts to eliminate corruption.49 The reason for
eliminating the word "Independent" was that the Basic Law provides only
for a "Commission Against Corruption" and, as such, Tung Chee-hwa,
Chief Executive of the HKSAR, explained it was his intention "to stick to the
letter of the Basic Law."50 If the international community continues to view
the ICAC as independent, this will lead to continued confidence in Hong
Kong's ability to provide the world with an efficient venue for business.
45. See id
46. See Tung Urges Hong Kong People to be Confident About Future, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 17,
1996, at 1, available in LEXIS News Library, Xinhua File.
47. In order to combat corruption in Hong Kong, the British set up the Independent Commission Against
Corruption ("ICAC") in 1974. This commission was fairly successful in establishing a climate of "fair
dealing." See Combating Corruption, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 13, 1997, at 20.
48. See Niall Fraser, Handover ICAC Title Sparks Clash, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 5, 1997, at 1.
49. See Hong Kong Graft Buster Vows No Letup After Handover, REuTERs WORLD SERV., June 3, 1997
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
50. See Fraser, supra note 48, at 14.
1998
HeinOnline  -- 22 S. Ill. U. L. J. 335 1997-1998
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
III. CONCLUSION
As days pass from July 1, 1997, the world is gaining insight into the
way China will manage Hong Kong. On the economic front, the Chinese
have done a remarkable job in maintaining a "hands off" policy. However,
this presupposes that Hong Kong will continue to contribute to China, and
that Hong Kong's political activities will remain at a level where direct
interference is unnecessary. If either of these factors should change, in all
likelihood, China will take away some of the autonomy Hong Kong was
promised in the Joint Declaration. 5
Even if China does keep its promise (as enumerated in the Basic Law)
to preserve Hong Kong's economic system, the international perception of
Hong Kong as a place to do business will remain of the utmost importance.
Perception of impartial enforcement of contracts, an equitable legal system,
a level playing field, and ease of conducting business in terms of minimal
bureaucratic interference will all be determinative of whether or not Hong
Kong remains a financial center in Asia. If these perceptions should change
due to excessive Chinese bureaucratic influence, perceived bias on the part
of the judiciary in its decisions, or corruption among the civil service, then
it is likely that no matter how much or how many times the Basic Law
assures Hong Kong of its economic independence, the international
community will shun Hong Kong. Therefore, it is the hope of Hong Kong's
businesses that China will let its self-interest in preserving Hong Kong's
booming economy override any other considerations. As it has been
previously warned, Hong Kong is the "goose that lays the golden egg."
Without careful nurturing, this "goose" may well die.52
51. Joint Declaration, supra note 15.
52. This would be particularly unfortunate since the Hong Kong government has recently killed Hong
Kong's 1.2 million chickens in an attempt to rid the SAR of the deadly bird flu virus. See 1.2M
Birds To Be Slaughtered, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 29, 1997, at 1.
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